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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

BRYANNA BERRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN JOSE POLICE OFFICER LINDSAY PARODI (4426),

Defendant.

Case No. 21-cv-08436-VKD

FURTHER ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S ΓΙΟΝ IN LIMINE NO. 4 AND PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED TRIAL **EXHIBIT 21**

Re: Dkt. Nos. 65, 67, 82

In Motion in Limine No. 4, Detective Alvarez¹ moved to exclude all evidence and argument regarding any Miranda² violation, arguing that such evidence and argument is irrelevant, misleading, and unduly prejudicial. See Dkt. No. 65, 67. The parties also dispute the admissibility of Ms. Berry's proposed trial Exhibit No. 21, which is a copy of Ms. Berry's Pitchess³ motion filed in the criminal prosecution against her. See Dkt. No. 68-2. Ms. Berry does not contend that her statements are inadmissible by virtue of any failure of police officers to give her a Miranda warning. See Dkt. No. 72 at 6; see also Dkt. No. 72. Rather, the parties' point of contention is whether any Miranda violation and Ms. Berry's Pitchess motion are relevant to her malicious prosecution claim.

The Court invited further briefing from the parties "including specifically caselaw, that

¹ Defendant previously advised that they are now known as Detective Lindsay Alvarez. For consistency with prior pretrial orders, the Court refers to defendant as Detective Alvarez in this order.

² Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

³ Pitchess v. Super. Ct., 11 Cal.3d 531 (1974).

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bears on the question of whether Ms. Berry may offer evidence of the facts and circumstances that preceded the dismissal of the criminal prosecution against her, and whether counsel may argue to the jury that they should infer from those circumstances that the prosecution lacked merit, or was the product of malicious motivation." Dkt. No. 72 at 7; see also Dkt. No. 73 at 6. Detective Alvarez filed a supplemental brief. Dkt. No. 82. Ms. Berry did not. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, Detective Alvarez's supplemental brief, as well as the arguments presented at the February 20, 2024 further pretrial conference, the Court grants Detective Alvarez's Motion in Limine No. 4 and excludes all evidence and argument regarding any Miranda violation, as well as Ms. Berry's proposed trial Exhibit No. 21.

"Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought . . . against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). To prevail on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff "must show that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional right." Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066 (same).

"Ordinarily, the decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to result from an independent determination on the part of the prosecutor, and thus, precludes liability for those who participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation of proceedings." Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. "However, the presumption of prosecutorial independence does not bar a subsequent § 1983 claim against state or local officials who improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings." *Id.* (citations omitted).

According to Ms. Berry, the alleged Miranda violation was committed by Sergeant White, who is not a defendant in this action. See Dkt. No. 67 at 3. Ms. Berry believes that the alleged Miranda violation may have been a reason for the dismissal of the criminal prosecution against her. She argues that she should be permitted to have the jury draw such an inference. See id. at 3-

Case 5:21-cv-08436-VKD Document 91 Filed 02/20/24 Page 3 of 3

4. With respect to her <i>Pitchess</i> motion, Ms. Berry posits that the filing of that motion may have
caused the prosecutor to dismiss the criminal action, inasmuch as the dismissal occurred on the
eve of the Pitchess motion hearing. See Dkt. No. 68 at 3. However, Ms. Berry presents no facts
or evidence that plausibly shows that Detective Alvarez had anything to do with the alleged
Miranda violation. Nor does Ms. Berry present any facts or evidence that sufficiently connects
her Pitchess motion to anything Detective Alvarez did or did not do that was "actively
instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings" against Ms. Berry. Awabdy, 368 F.30
at 1067. The alleged Miranda violation and Ms. Berry's Pitchess motion therefore are irrelevant
misleading, and more prejudicial than probative. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403.

Accordingly, the Court grants Detective Alvarez's Motion in Limine No. 4 to exclude all evidence and argument regarding any alleged *Miranda* violation. The Court also sustains Detective Alvarez's objection to Ms. Berry's *Pitchess* motion (proposed trial Exhibit No. 21).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 20, 2024

Virginia K. DeMarchi United States Magistrate Judge